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Mr. Zarbock

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FBI - MIAMI  
DRC EOI CASE NO. 620289  
this document consists of 3 pages  
number 1 of 3

G/PB

Bernbaum

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F730011-3909

November 7, 1962

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To : G - Mr. U. Alexis Johnson  
From : G/PB - Jeffrey C. Kitchen  
Subject: Requirements for Pressure on USSR and Cuba

The Soviets evidently are attempting to remove their MRBM's from Cuba as rapidly as possible, with limited verification at sea of their removal, in the expectation that the United States will then be less likely and less able to make effective its demands for verification on the ground in Cuba. They also probably expect that as time goes on they will be able to exact from the US more extensive commitments against not only invasion but other direct and indirect means of intervention in Cuba.

We do not know the extent to which the Soviets would like to get Cuban acquiescence in verification arrangements, or the extent to which they may be artfully using Cuban non-agreement as an excuse. It is likely that the Soviets have found Castro unwilling to proceed with some arrangements to which they do not particularly object themselves. At the same time, they are doubtless quite ready to use the lever of the requirement for Cuban consent to try and pry various assurances from the US, and to get the US to drop some of its demands. In any case, however, we believe that the US should in the first instance place clearly on the Soviets the burden of securing whatever Cuban compliance may be required to meet our demands. It is important that we never forget, nor let the Soviets doubt our clarity about, the extent to which Cuba presently is reliant upon Soviet support. If the Soviets apply maximum leverage against the Cubans this is to our advantage. If it succeeds in gaining Cuban acquiescence so much the better. If it fails we are then in a position to make clear to the Soviets that any inability on their part to secure such Cuban acquiescence will require us to impose unilateral pressures on Cuba in order to compel Cuban acceptance of our initial objective.

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The United States should make clear that we expect the Soviets and/or Cubans to provide and permit: (a) removal of the missiles and bombers; (b) adequate verification of the removal of these weapons and assurance that such removal which requires inspection on the ground in Cuba; and (c) adequate long-term arrangements providing for the re-introduction of such weapons into Cuba. If these basic elements of our agreement are not fulfilled, the US considers that there has been no contract, and we retain complete freedom of action. If they are satisfactorily fulfilled, the United States will of course honor its commitment.

The initial major move which the US could undertake to apply pressure on Castro would be an intensification of the quarantine. Institution of a full scale blockade (excluding only food and medicines) would quickly cast the long shadow of a severe future economic pinch. It would probably be desirable to indicate soon to the Soviets that we would implement such a measure, pointing out that while this might introduce certain new problems, it would be necessary unless they were able to assure Cuban compliance. This should be conveyed in a manner which suggests that the Soviets have no doubt exercised their option on the Cubans but unsuccessfully. In this event, surely there can be little objection to our "helping" to apply pressure to accomplish our mutual objective, i.e., fulfillment of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. This would also put the Soviets on the defensive insofar as running Soviet ships through the blockade. A blockade, of course, would be only one of the means to which we might be compelled to resort.

The most immediate problem has been to secure Soviet agreement to the removal of the offensive weapons. The question of adequate verification that such removal has been completed is, however, completely interrelated. The longer that the United States permits these questions to remain unanswered, the more difficult it will be to take such direct action as may be required to achieve the objectives set forth by the Presidents on October 22 and the more likely are we to draw US relations with our allies, by inaction if political pressure is not used, into the focus out of the national security domain which it belongs and by the probability that the Soviets will gain a

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3.

impressive view of US ability to follow through on a course once launched. The temptation for them to revert to an air against again exists in other areas, e.g., Berlin, thus may be increased.



cc: U - Mr. Ball  
S/P - Mr. Boston  
ABA - Mr. Martin  
JME - Mr. Milwaukee  
JO - Mr. Cleveland

C/PW: E.L.Gerthoff/Melvin/JCKitchen: rp

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G/PM

November 7, 1962

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3.

impressive view of US ability to follow through on a course once launched. The temptation for them to revert to an on again-off again tactic in other areas, e.g., Berlin, thus may be increased.

cc: U - Mr. Ball  
S/P - Mr. Rostow  
ARA - Mr. Martin  
INR - Mr. Hilsman  
IO - Mr. Cleveland

G/PM: RLGarthoff/SWeiss/JCKitchen:rp

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CIA DR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

TOP SECRET

November 7, 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To : G - Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

WMC 62

From : G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

DEP'TY UNDER

Subject: Requirements for Pressure on USSR and Cuba

S. CRETARY OF STATE

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IRBMs from Cuba as rapidly as possible, with limited verifica-  
tion at sea of their removal.

(b) (1)

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like to get Cuban acquiescence in verification arrangements,  
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found Castro unwilling to proceed with some arrangements to  
which they do not particularly object themselves.

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
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2.

The United States should make clear that we expect the Soviets and/or Cubans to provide and permit: (a) removal of the missiles and bombers; (b) adequate verification of the removal of these weapons and assurance that none remain-- which requires inspection on the ground in Cuba; and (c) adequate long-term arrangements providing assurance against the reintroduction of such weapons into Cuba. If any of these basic elements of our agreement are not fulfilled, the US considers that there has been no contract, and we retain complete freedom of action. If they are satisfactorily fulfilled, the United States will of course honor its commitment.



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